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The Expansion of Horizontal Merger Defenses
After General Dynamics: A Suggested
Reconsideration of Sherman Act Principles
James F. Ponsoldt*
INTRODUCTION

Logic suggests that if an agreement between two direct competitors to end a price war, allocate customers or refuse to deal with a
third party is plainly anticompetitive and forbidden under applicable federal antitrust laws, then a complete integration between
those same two direct competitors is equally anticompetitive and
similarly should be forbidden. At one point, Congress thought so
and the Supreme Court so held, notwithstanding the obvious business advantages enjoyed by the integrated company. In recent
years, however, Congress, the Supreme Court and many commentators have changed their view of horizontal integration, and it is
now reasonably possible for two direct competitors to merge without violating the federal antitrust laws.
Until 1974, the Supreme Court applied section 7 of the post1950 Clayton Act' to horizontal mergers in practically the same
manner as it applied section 1 of the Sherman Act' and section 3
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1968, Cornell University; J.D.
1972, Harvard University.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one
or more corporations engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of
the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in pertinent part- "Every contract, combined in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ..
"
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of the Clayton Act' to tying arrangement cases." In effect, horizontal mergers were held to constitute per se violations of the Clayton
Act whenever the defendant had substantial economic power in the
relevant market. 5 Moreover, defendants generally were precluded
from introducting collateral evidence relevant to "reasonableness"
or so-called "competitive realities" to rebut the merger
challenged. 6
The Burger Court's 1974 decision in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp.,7 dramatically changed horizontal merger litigation in favor of defendants.8 Courts now seem to be applying a de

15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities ...
or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
4. See note 23 infra for a discussion of the application of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3
of the Clayton Act to tying arrangements.
5. See notes 26-52 infra and accompanying text.
6. See generally Areeda, Structure-PerformanceAssumptions in Recent Merger Cases,
reprinted in PUBLIC POLICY TowARD MERGERS (Weston and Altzman eds. 1969); RocKEmLLER, ANTITRUST QUESTIONS AND ANswmEs, 185 (1974). For a criticism of this approach, see
Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CORNELL L. Rv. 161, 204-208 (1970).
7. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
8. See, e.g., FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (1979); F.&M. Shaefer Corp. v. C.
Schmidt's Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. International Harvester
Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1978); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368 (1978);
Liggett and Myers, Inc. v. FTC, 567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1977); BOC International v. FTC,
557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D.
Wisc. 1979); ITT v. ATr, 444 F. Supp. 1148 (1978); United States v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Babcock and Wilcox v. United Technologies Co., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977); FTC v.
Tenneco, 433 F. Supp. 105 (D. D.C. 1977); United States v. Black and Decker Mfg., 430 F.
Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa.
1976); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976); United States v.
Federal Co., 403 F. Supp. 161 (N.D. Tenn. 1975); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975); United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975);
United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1975); United States v.
Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); aff'd, 535 F.2d 1243 (1975); American
General Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 557 (1977); Liggett and Myers, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074 (1976), af'd,
567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1977); RSR Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800 (1976); Litton Indus., Inc., 85
F.T.C. 333 (1975); Lektro-Vend Corp. and Stoner Investments, Inc. v. The Vendo Corp.,
1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,444, July 18, 1980; Pillsbury Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21.586
3.
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facto Sherman Act "rule of reason" standard of legality in analyzing horizontal mergers challenged under section 7. Several courts
even seem to have gone so far as to accept economic "efficiency"
arguments, which traditionally have supported successful rule of
reason defenses only in cases involving quasi-public utilities or extremely concentrated markets.9
This article will examine the changing legal standards used to
evaluate the legality of horizontal integration between direct competitors. It will first provide a summary of pre-1974 horizontal
merger case law under section 7 of the Clayton Act as originally
enacted and as amended by the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act. Next,
this article will discuss General Dynamics and the impact of that
decision on defenses to merger challenges. It will then analyze the
application of the General Dynamics approach by the federal
courts, and the concomitant impact of Sherman Act principles
upon those courts and the Federal Trade Commission. Finally, this
article will conclude that, in implementing a General Dynamicstype approach, many lower courts have failed to accord sufficient
deference to Congress' intent underlying the Celler-Kefauver Act.
HORIZONTAL MERGER

LAW PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE

CELLER-KEFAUVER

ACT

The original statutory antitrust tool for challenging business
mergers was section 1 of the Sherman Act, which broadly prohibits
combinations in restraint of trade.10 Between 1890 and 1914, the
government invoked section 1 against merger activity with varying
degrees of success." The broad reach of the section was cut back,
(FTC 1979); Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,393, December 6, 1978.
9. See generally, Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975 Duwz L.J. 1

(1975); Kolb, The Impact of Business Realities in Recent Potential Competition and Horizontal Merger Cases-The Government Can Lose, 47 ANTrmUST L.J. 955 (1978) [hereinaf-

ter cited as Kolb]; Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 92 HARv. L. Rav. 491 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Horizontal Mergers].
10. See note 2 supra. Combinations between competitors controlling a substantial share
of the relevant market also have been challenged simultaneously under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), which provides in pertinent part- "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony..."
11. The first Sherman Act case to reach the Supreme Court was United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), in which the Court upheld several acquisitions of sugar refineries by the defendants, resulting in a 98% market share, based on the now rejected commerce clause ground that manufacturing was distinct from "commerce" and therefore the
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however, in 1911 when the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States1 2 construed section 1 to prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints of trade. By narrowing the literal applicability of
the Sherman Act, the Court permitted merging companies to present an unlimited variety of "reasonableness" defenses to merger

challenges.
In response to the Standard Oil decision, Congress enacted section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1914.18 The statute provided that certain stock acquisitions between competing corporations leading to
horizontal integration would be proscribed under the federal antitrust laws whenever the acquisitions would result in a specific lessening of competition between the two companies involved, a general restraint upon trade, or a tendency toward monopoly in any
market as a whole.1 4 Thus, whenever a horizontal stock acquisition
was accompanied or followed by a merger and consequent elimination of competition between the respective companies, section 7
served as a per se barrier to the merger regardless of the size of the
merging companies, the structure of the relevant market, or the
underlying purpose for the merger. 15
Sherman Act was inapplicable. The next merger case, Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 (1904), involved a challenge to the formation of a trust uniting two major
railroads. The Court stuck down the merger, suggesting that any merger between competitors was plainly forbidden by the Sherman Act. Only two years later, however, the Court
upheld, for ambiguous reasons, a horizontal assets acquisition in Cincinnati Packet Co. v.
Bay, 200 U.S. 179 (1906). For a broader discussion of judicial treatment of mergers during
this time period, see generally M NARr, MNfi mas AN THE CLAYTON AcT (1959) [hereinafter
cited as MARIN]; NELSON, MEaGER MovEamNrs iN AmcAN INDusTmY, 1895-1956 (1959).
12. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
13. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914).
14. The statute provided in pertinent part[n]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
For a discussion of the Act, see MARTI, supra note 11.
15. Section 7 of the Clayton Act thus manifested congressional intent to return to a
mode of analysis for horizontal integration similar to that originally proposed in Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). See note 11 supra. See generally MARTIN,
supra note 11.
The Northern Sec. decision suggested a per se rule for Sherman Act cases, which was
even earlier noted in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898). The rule is
generally thought to have been fully formulated, however, in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), where an agreement among competitors to fix prices was
condemned as being in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The term "illegal per se" was
not specifically used until United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221
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In 1948, however, the Supreme Court once again curtailed the
potentially broad proscriptions of the antitrust laws as applied to
horizontal mergers. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,16 the

Court was called upon to evaluate both the horizontal and vertical
aspects of an asset acquisition involving two major steel producers.1 Rejecting a per se approach, the Court upheld the acquisition as one which did not unreasonably lessen competition. 8 The

Court examined various evidence and data provided by both the
government and merging defendants and fully entered into an
analysis of structural change. By implementing this approach, the
Court suggested that an effective evaluation of the legality of the
proposed merger could only be accomplished by means of a "rule
of reason" analysis. 9
Two years after Columbia Steel, Congress again singled out

(1940), where it was held to apply under the Sherman Act to any combination having the
effect of raising, fixing, or stabilizing prices. The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed
the per se rule in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980) as a relevant
and vital rule of Sherman Act construction.
One of the most oft-cited descriptions of the per se rule was given by Justice Black in
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle
of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned,
but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as
related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint
has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in
and of themselves are price fixing. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 210; division of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85
F. 271, af'd, 175 U.S. 211; group boycotts, Fashion Originators'Guild v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457; and tying arrangements, InternationalSalt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392."
Id. at 5. The list of per se illegal conduct has developed gradually. In particular, the Court
has never expressly addressed the issue of whether a merger between direct competitors is
or should be subject to the per se rule under § I of the Sherman Act. See SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTmTRusT, § 196 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN).
16. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
17. Because the horizontal integration at issue involved an acquisition of assets and not
stocks, § 7 of the Clayton Act was inapplicable to challenge the merger and suit was brought
by the government pursuant to §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
18. United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495, 508 (1948).
19. For a discussion of a rule of reason analysis in Sherman Act cases, see Pitofsky, The
Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. RzV. 1
(1978).

366
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mergers for separate antitrust attention by enacting the CellerKefauver Act to amend section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 0 Although
the sentiment of that legislation was decidedly anti-merger, the
legislation also eliminated, with the approval of the Federal Trade
Commission, the per se treatment of horizontal stock acquisitions
under the original Clayton Act."1 In doing so, however, Congress
clearly intended to reject the Columbia Steel rule of reason analysis.2 2 Instead, Congress sought to enable the courts to strike down
mergers without requiring either a wide-ranging and ambiguous
structural analysis, or a consideration of various defense evidence
traditionally presented in rule of reason cases.1s
HORIZONTAL MERGER LAW AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE CELLERKEFAUVER ACT

The original version of section 7 of the Clayton Act, incorporating the per se barrier to horizontal stock acquisitions, generated
relatively little case law. Prior to 1950, horizontal integration was
accomplished by assets acquisitions which could survive a rule of
reason analysis under the Sherman Act 24 as well as Federal Trade
20. Celler-Kefauver Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). See note 1
supra.
21. For a discussion of the Clayton Act amendment and its purpose, see Brown Shoe
Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-23 (1962). See also Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAlv. L. REv. 226, 233-38 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bok].
22. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957). The
Senate Report on the amendment stated:
The committee wish to make it clear that the bill is not intended to revert to the
Sherman Act test. The intent here.., is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in
their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a
Sherman Act proceeding ...
[The] various additions and deletions-some
strengthening and others weakening the bill-are not conflicting in purpose and
effect. They merely are different steps toward the same objective, namely, that of
framing a bill which, though dropping portions of the so-called Clayton Act test
that have no economic significance reaches far beyond the Sherman Act.
S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Seas. 4-5, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. Saav. 4293,
4296-97.
23. At about the same time Congress enacted the Clayton Act amendment, the Supreme
Court began to develop a hybird per se rule to accomplish a similar result in cases challenging tying arrangements under § 3 of the Clayton Act In more recent cases, the Court implicitly has held that such a hybrid per se rule would apply in the same fashion to tying cases
brought under the Sherman Act, thereby construing the Clayton Act standard of illegality,
applicable to both tying arrangements and mergers, as much narrower than the Sherman
Act rule of reason standards. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429
U.S. 610 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495 (1948) discussed in notes 1619 supra and notes 148-153 infra and accompanying text.
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Commission challenges under section 7 of the Clayton Act.25 After
the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950, however, the demise of the per se rule encouraged businessmen and their lawyers
to attempt to validate horizontal integration by claiming that the
merger would not "substantially lessen competition" in any relevant market. The basic issue confronting the courts in the section
7 cases following the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act was one
of statutory construction or, more accurately, a determination of
what evidence should be considered under a section 7 merger
challenge.
Paradigm of Section Seven Analysis: Bethelehem Steel
One of the first major horizontal merger cases to be litigated after 1950 resulted in a lengthy and perceptive opinion by Judge
Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York which could have
served as a model for subsequent analysis of mergers challenged
under section 7 of the Clayton Act. In United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corporation," the government claimed that a merger between Bethlehem Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube would
"substantially lessen competition in the iron and steel industry as
a whole and in a variety of important products on a nationwide
basis as well as in many areas of the country. 2 7 The court, placing
primary reliance upon statistical evidence describing the premerger and post-merger structure of the relevant market, held that
the proposed merger between Bethlehem Steel, the second largest
steel producer in the country, and Youngstown Steel, the sixth
largest steel producer,2 8 would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.
As part of its defense, Bethlehem Steel had urged the court to
consider the allegedly beneficial aspects of the merger. In particular, it argued that any lessening of competition should be balanced
against the benefits which would accrue from the company's plan
to expand the existing Youngstown Sheet and Tube plants. Bethlehem Steel claimed that such a plan would create new steel capacity
in the steel-deficient Chicago area and would enable the merged
company to give "more effective and vigorous competition" to
25. See, e.g., Arrow-Hart and Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
26. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
27. Id. at 581.
28. The court noted that in 1957, Bethlehem Steel accounted for a 15.4% market share
in the steel ingot industry, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube accounted for a 4.7% market
share. Id. at 585.
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United States Steel, the industry leader, than either firm could
give separately."' Each firm claimed that neither would be able to
unilaterally undertake the program of expansion necessary to remedy the critical shortage in the Chicago area of heavy structural
shapes and plates. Together, however, they could increase capacity
and increase competition in that submarket, thereby offsetting any
lessening of competition in the submarket in which the proposed
merger would increase market power.
The court found this line of reasoning unpersuasive. The court
held that, although a merger may have a different impact in different markets, if the effect is to lessen competition in any relevant
market, then good motives and even demonstrable effects in another market are irrelevant to a determination of the legality of the
merger under section 7.10 Moreover, in response to the defendants'
contention that the merger was justified on the grounds that more
vigorous and effective competition with United States Steel would
be promoted, the court alluded to the "domino" effect of adopting
such a rationale: other firms in a particular industry would seek to
join forces against companies with large market shares, thereby
further increasing concentration in the industry."1 The court declared that its function was to carry out congressional policy underlying section 7 of the Clayton Act and to apply the statute as
written. It further deemed it dangerous and inappropriate to
"slid[e] unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the
more spacious domain of policy." ' Thus the court rebuffed eco29. Id. at 615. Citing the deficit of adequate steel capacity in the Chicago area and contending that new steel consumers were locating in other regions because of that inadequate
supply, Bethlehem Steel also argued that this situation was a "wasteful drag on the country's economic resources." Id. at 616.
30. "If the merger offends the statute in any relevant market then good motives and
even demonstrable benefits are irrelevant and afford no defense. Section 7 'is violated
whether nor not actual restraints or monopolies, or the substantial lessening of competition,
have occurred or are intended.' [citation omitted]" Id. at 617. The court emphasized that
the congressional policy underlying § 7 focused on the preservation of competition over
economies of scale, and that the court's intention to carry out this policy would not be
influenced by arguments delineating supposed economic benefits of efficiency. Id.
31. The court stated:
Congress in seeking to halt the growing tendency to increased concentration of

power in various industries was fully aware of the arguments in support of the
supposed advantages of size and the claim of greater efficiency and lower cost to
the ultimate consumer. It made no distinction between good mergers and bad
mergers. It condemned all which came within the reach of the prohibition of section 7.
Id. at 618.
32. Id., quoting from Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. Producer's Livestock Manufactur-
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nomic arguments generated by efficiency-minded businessmen and
refused to adopt a balancing approach to evaluate the legality of
the challenged merger.
The Pre-1974 Presumptive Illegality Test For Horizontal
Mergers
In 1962, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret
8
the Celler-Kefaufer Act in Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States.
Finding that Congress intended a merger to be viewed "functionally. . . in the context of its particular industry,"8 the Court held
that, to determine whether a merger might substantially lessen
competition, a section 7 analysis required an examination of several factors. These included current market concentration, trends
toward concentration of the industry, and entry barriers when the
market shares of the parties to the merger were insubstantial.8"
One year later, in United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank," the Court simplified the multi-factor approach adopted in
Brown Shoe. The Court suggested that inquiry into future anticompetitive impact became necessary only when current market
share statistics were ambiguous or insufficient to make out a prima
facie case for the government. Seeking to adhere to its perception
of congressional intent underlying section 7, the Court announced
a rule of presumptive illegality for any merger producing a firm

ing Ass'n, 356 U.S. 282, 289 (1958).
33. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
34. Id. at 321-22.
35. The Court held that a merger between competing and vertically related shoe companies violated the Clayton Act even though the respective market shares of the surviving
company were small. The Court stated that:
[w]hether the consolidation was to take place in an industry that was fragmented
rather than concentrated, that had seen a recent trend toward domination by a
few leaders or had remained fairly consistent in its distribution of market shares
among the participating companies, that had experienced easy access to markets
by suppliers and easy access to suppliers by buyers or had witnessed foreclosure of
business, that had witnessed the ready entry of new competition or the erection of
barriers to prospective entrants, all were aspects, varying in importance with the
merger under consideration, which would properly be taken into account.
Id. at 322. In a footnote, the Court further stated:
[s]tatistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the industry leaders
and the parties to the merger are, of course, the primary index of market power;
but only a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history
and probably future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable
anticompetitive effect of the merger.
Id., n.38.
36. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market and
resulting in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in
that market.87 The Court then found that a merger which produced a bank controlling 30% of the commercial banking market
and which resulted in more than a 33 % increase in market concentration
established a presumption that the merger violated section
8
7.

The Court also discussed the proffered defenses and found all of
the them insufficient to rebut the presumption raised by the market statistics. The defendant had introduced at trial the testimony
of bank officers of small banks that post-merger competition remained vigorous. The Court found the testimony of lay persons
unpersuasive, however, in matters as complex as merger law. 9 The
Court also refused to accept the defendant's procompetitive justifications for the merger. The defendant claimed that, after the
merger, the resulting bank could increase lending limits to a level
which would permit competition with large out-of-state banks. The
Court held, however, that it would not sanction a substantial lessening of competition in one market to achieve alleged procompetitive consequences in another.40 Further, the Court held that the
defendant's assertions that the presence of a large bank stimulated
Philadelphia's economy could not justify the merger because Congress had "proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the
'41
malignant alike.
After PhiladelphiaNational Bank, the Supreme Court continued to refuse to lend credence either to defenses to section 7 challenges or to affirmative justifications for merger activity.'2 During

37.

A merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms
in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it
must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not
likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
Id. at 363.
38. Id. at 364-65.
39. Id. at 366-67.
40. Id. at 370-71.

41.

Id. at 371. The Court also rejected the following claims raised by the defendant as

justifications for the merger- (1) that unhappy customers of the merged bank could turn to
other banks in Philadelphia, id. at 361; (2) that because the banking industry is highly regulated, it is immune from anticompetitive concentration, id. at 368; and (3) that only through
mergers can banks expand from their primary locations, id. at 370.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v.
Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Rome
Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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this time, the Court became more sensitive to predictable future
anticompetitive impact posed by mergers regardless of the business
justifications asserted in defense of integration. As a result, the
Philadelphia National Bank presumption became virtually irrebuttable. The effect of this was to establish a de facto per se rule
of illegality in horizontal merger cases.
Furthermore, the size of the market required to create a Philadelphia National Bank presumption of illegality quickly declined.
This is exemplified by a case decided in 1966 at the highwater
mark of the antimerger campaign initiated by the Department of
Justice. In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,'5 the Supreme

Court held that a horizontal merger which resulted in a firm holding a 7.5% market share violated section 7 of the Clayton Act."

Although the Court relied on a past concentration trend in the relevant market in holding the merger unlawful,'5 the fact that a violation of section 7 was found in a marginal market share context
indicated that such marginal figures would not preclude the Court
from finding that the effect of the merger might nonetheless substantially lessen competition or represent incipient monopoly.4"

Although the Supreme Court during this period refused to recognize many defenses, the Court did approve the long-established
"failing company" defense.' 7 To successfully assert the defense,
however, a defendant would be required to prove both: 1) that one
43. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
44. Id. at 272. The holding prompted Justice Stewart to write in his dissenting opinion
that "[t]he sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government
always wins." Id. at 301.
45. Id. at 278.
46. For a discussion of early constructions of the language found in § 7 of the Clayton
Act relating to a substantial lessening of competition, see Bok, supra note 21; Kintner &
Postol, A Review of the Law of Horizontal Mergers, 66 Gao. L.J. 1405 (1978); Lurie, Mergers Under the Burger Court: An Anti-Antitrust Bias and Its Implications, 23 VmL.L. Rav.
213 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lurie]; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:
An analysis of the Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975); Shenefield, Annual Survey of antitrust Developments-Class Actions, Mergers, and Market Definition: A New Trend Toward Neutrality,
32 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 299 (1975); Sloviter, The October 1973 Term Merger Cases:
Whither Clayton § 7?, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 861 (1975).
47. For a discussion of the failing company defense, see Note, The Failing Company
Doctrine Since General Dynamics: More than Excess Baggage, 47 FoRDHAM L. Rzy. 872
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Failing Company]; Note, All the King's Horses and All the
King's Men: The Failing Company Doctrine as a Conditional Defense to Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 4 HOFSTA L. Rav. 643 (1976) [hereinafter cited as King's Horses]; Comment,
FederalAntitrust Law-Mergers-An Updatingof the "FailingCompany" Doctrine in the
Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MICH. L. Rav. 566 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Updating].
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party to the merger faced a grave probability of business failure;
and 2) that no merger with an alternative purchaser existed which
would result in fewer anticompetitive effects.4 8 The first requirement was based in part on the theory that a company that would
soon be forced from the market because of economic failure may
merge without endangering competition.4 9 The second requirement
attempted to ensure that the failing company had adopted the
least anticompetitive alternative.5 0 Notwithstanding the broad assertions of economic and social policy originally underlying the recognition of the failing company defense,5 1 however, the Court has
narrowly construed its applicability and has rarely permitted defendants to successfully assert the defense.5 2
GENERAL DYNAMICS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF COMPETITIVE

REALITIES DEFENSES

The Supreme Court's 1974 decision in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp.5a signalled a dramatic change in the analysis of
mergers. General Dynamics constituted a turning point in the law
not only because it was the first horizontal merger case that the
government had lost on the merits in the Supreme Court since the
enactment of the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act,' but also
48. In Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), Justice Douglas suggested a third requirement for the failing company defense: "[pirospects of reorganization
...would have had to be dim or nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine applicable to this case." Id. at 138. In United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549
(1971) and in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), the Court did
not mention the requirement of dim prospects of reorganization in its discussion of the failing company defense. Cf. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975) (the
"dim reorganization" statement in Citizen Publishing Co. should be confined to the facts of
that case).
49. See Citizen Publishing co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-39 (1969). See also
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); United States v. Third
Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
50. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-39 (1969).
51. In International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), the case in which the failing
company defense originated, the Supreme Court found that a merger which saves a company from failure often benefits society. The Court noted that, by merger, a business failure
which results in "loss to [the company's] stockholders and injury to the communities where
[the company's] plants were operated" may be avoided. Id. at 302.
52. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969).
53. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
54. Prior to 1974, the government won every merger case decided by written opinion in
the Supreme Court. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v.
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because the Court implicitly rejected the legal standard established
in Philadelphia National Bank." By applying the premise that
the government's statistical case is not conclusive but rather is
merely a first step in proving a section 7 violation, the case effectively established a more comprehensive standard of proof and a
heavier burden of persuasion on the government, while also
refocusing attention upon defenses to a section 7 horizontal merger
challenge."
The case involved the 1959 acquisition of a controlling interest
in United Electric Coal Companies, a coal producer operating strip
mines, by Material Services Corporation, a coal producer mining
deep-shaft coal mines. The government challenged the acquisition
under section 7 of the Clayton Act. On appeal of the government's
case, the Supreme Court held that market share statistics introduced by the government constituted sufficient prima facie evidence that the merger would lessen competition under the Philadelphia National Bank test.57
The Court then turned to a consideration of the defendant's evidence. The defendant had argued that electric utility companies
were the major consumers of coal and that the coal companies sold
nearly all of their coal under long term requirements contracts to
these utility companies. The defendant claimed that United Electric's coal reserves were almost totally depleted; that this depletion
would prevent United Electric from obtaining long term requirements contracts with utility companies in the future; and therefore, as a matter of business reality, the merger would not substantially lessen competition." The Court found this evidence
persuasive and held that the defendant's evidence relating to its
diminished resources rebutted the government's statistical case.56
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, cited Brown Shoe for
the proposition that a broad, "functional" inquiry was required to
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminun Co. of America
(Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. El Paso Nat'l Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964); United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See also FTC v. Proctor and Gamble Co. (Clorox), 386
U.S. 568 (1967) and FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).

55. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
56. Although the Brown Shoe opinion had suggested a similar approach, Justice Warren
in that case apparently sought out additional competitive factors only to buttress a weak
statistical case. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 339-46 (1962).
57. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974).
58. Id. at 501-02.

59. Id. at 506.
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determine the legality of a merger challenged under section 7 of
the Claytion Act.60 The Court further stated that market statistics
meeting PhiladelphiaNational Bank standards could be successfully rebutted if they failed to reflect anticipated future competitive behavior of companies in the market. 1 In the case before it,
the Court found that, because the coal industry operated under a
long-term requirements contracts system, the current state of a
company's coal reserves necessarily determined its furture competitive strength, and, therefore, market share statistics based upon
past coal production were of little relevance." The Court thus concluded that the defendant's evidence revealing the depletion of
United Electric's coal reserves established that the merger with
United Electric would not substantially lessen competition." The
Court's holding therefore appeared to be predicated on the absence
of any significant anticompetitive effects of the merger with respect to future market conditions, rather than on the existence of
any procompetitive market effects.
The Court also rejected the government's claim that the defendant's reliance on depleted and committed resources was essentially a failing company defense and that the defendant failed to
meet the strict requirements of that defense." The Court stated
that whether a defendant's assertion of a failing company defense
is meritorious is relevant only after the government has established
that the challenged merger violates section 7. In General Dynamics, however, the defendant's evidence "went to the heart" of the
government's case to defeat the claim that a violation of section 7
had occurred."
Finally, the Court rejected the government's claim that the depletion of United Electric's strip mine reserves had no significance

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 501.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 503-04.
The Court defined the failing company defense as one which:
. . . presupposes that the effect on competition and the 'loss to [the company's]
stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were operated,'..
will be less if a company continues to exist even as a party to a merger than if it
disappears entirely from the market. It is, in a sense, a 'lesser of two evils' approach, in which the possible threat to competition resulting from an acquisition
is deemed preferable to the adverse impact on competition and other losses if the
company goes out of business.
Id. at 507.
65. Id. at 508.
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because the company could acquire other strip mine reserves or
develop the expertise to mine deep mine reserves. Instead, the
Court affirmed the finding of the district court that new strip mine
reserves were not available. Moreover, the Court refused to speculate whether United Electric could develop the skills necessary to
mine deep reserves. 66
In General Dynamics, the Court accepted the argument that although an ostensible competitor may not be a failing company, it
may nevertheless offer such ineffective practical competition that
merger with such a company would not violate section 7. The
Court accepted the contention that for purposes of determining
section seven violations, there might be factors other than government statistics based on past market activity governing the "focus
of competition." In effect, the Court placed a new emphasis on the
7
structure, history, and probable future of the relevant market.

POST GENERAL DYNAMICS DEVELOPMENTS:

"COMPETITIVE

WEAKNESS" VARIANTS AND ECONOMIC BALANCING IN THE LOWER

COURTS

The Supreme Court failed in General Dynamics to specifically
identify the criteria for determining when a horizontal merger between two direct competitors may "substantially" lessen competition in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 8 arguably confining its holding to the relatively unique facts of the case and the
government's evidentiary deficiencies. Specifically, the General
Dynamics decision is silent as to whether any balancing test
should be applied to weigh the allegedly procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of a challenged merger and as to how com66.

Id. at 508-10.
67. Subsequently, the Court in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602 (1974) extended the General Dynamics rationale to a market extension merger between
two banks. The banks, one in Spokane and one in Seattle, were not in direct competition.
The government based its § 7 challenge partly upon a potential competition doctrine in
contending that if the merger were prohibited, the acquiring bank would find an alternative
means to enter the market which would have fewer anticompetitive effects. Finding that the
market statistics introduced by the government established a prima facie case under the
PhiladelphiaNationalBank test, the court placed "the burden... upon appellees to show
that the concentration ratios, which can be unreliable indicators of actual market behavior
... did not accurately depict the economic characteristics of the Spokane market." Id. at
631.
68. For example, the Court failed to adequately address the differences between the failing company defense and a depleted resources defense or what facts and market data would
be relevant to either. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507-10
(1974) and notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
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plex an inquiry a trial court should make into future market conditions. As a result, lower federal courts have had few guidelines to
follow in analyzing section 7 horizontal merger cases arising after
General Dynamics, other than the clear mandate to permit defendants more flexibility in justifying mergers.
In recent section 7 litigation, the lower courts have interpreted
General Dynamics as encouraging consideration of a wide variety
of defense evidence including an examination of somewhat speculative business and economic realities and the allegedly procompetitive effects of integration. Some defendants contend such evidence falls within the boundaries of the traditional failing
company defense. 69 These defendants argue that where imminent
failure would force a company to leave the market, a merger with
that company will not have an anticompetitve effect on the market. Two other defense variations are each based on either the
financial or technological weakness of one company.70 It is argued
that because the financially or technologically weak company is not
a significant competitor in the market, a merger with that company will not substantially lessen competition. This "non-competitor" rationale arguably also reinforces an "efficiency" defense.7 1
Under that theory, the potentially anticompetitive effect of eliminating a competitor from the market is overcome by a twofold benefit: (1) an ineffective and inefficient competitor is not longer an
"economic liability" to the market; and (2) the erstwhile competitor theoretically is rejuvenated by the merger and, with its combined assets, is a more vigorous competitor. 2 On balance, then,
there is no lessening of competition.
These new defenses rest upon the common substantive premise
that when a company experiences a certain level of financial or
technological difficulty, its merger with another company, however
strong, will not substantially lessen competition. Yet the consideration of these defenses, underscored by the claim that procompetitive possibilities may outweigh concededly anticompetitive effects,
goes far beyond the statutory framework of analysis of section 7.
The practical implications of this view7 ' merit a closer examination
69. See notes 74-96 infra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 97-123 infra and accompanying text.
71. See Kolb, supra note 9.
72. See notes 124-143 infra and accompanying text.
73. Since the 1974 GeneralDynamics decision, the government has won only half of the
horizontal merger cases that it has challenged under § 7 of the Clayton Act. See Failing
Company, supra note 47, at 879, n. 51.
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each of these defenses.
The Homogenized Failing Company Defense
Several lower courts continued to hold after General Dynamics
that only a defendant who satisfies the stringent requirements of
the traditional failing company doctrine can overcome a prima facie case of merger illegality predicated on market share statistics.
In United States v. Healthco,Inc.,74 for example, a New York district court concluded that market statistics presented by the government presumptively established that the defendant, a dealer in
dental equipment, violated section 7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring other dental dealers. The defendant had contended that the
acquired companies were not "vigorous" or "formidable" competitors.7s The court rejected this defense, however, stating that the

application of the failing company defense clearly was not warranted under the facts as presented. 7 The court recognized the
General Dynamics distinction between a failing company and
weakened resource defense"7 and strictly construed the requirements for a failing company defense. 8
Upon close scrutiny, it is not clear whether this strict approach
to the use of the failing company defense is consistent with the
approach set forth by the Supreme Court in General Dynamics to
evaluate the legality of a merger challenged under section 7 of the
Clayton Act. Although the Court in General Dynamics recognized
the defense and its strict requirements, the Court also approved of
the use of depleted resources statistics to rebut a prima facie
case. 79 Whether a defendant introduces depleted resources statis74. 387 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afr'd, 535 F.2d 1243 (2d Cir. 1975).
75. 387 F. Supp. at 273.
76. The court stated that the defendant did not "appear to invoke the 'failing company
doctrine' [citation omitted] for which there is not the slightest support in the evidence." Id.
77. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
78. See also United States v. Black and Decker Mfg., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976)
(defendant had not satisfied the alternative purchaser requirement and therefore could not
assert the defense); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975) (only
upon a defendant's satisfying both requirements of the failing company defense could such
a defense properly be asserted); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538 (M.D.
Tenn. 1975) (the fact that the earnings of a company's division were unsatisfactory does not
put the company within the definition of a failing company defense).
In In re Liggett & Myers, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074 (1976), afl'd, 567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1977),
the Federal Trade Commission adopted a position similar to that taken by the court in
Healthco.
79. It should be recalled that the Court in GeneralDynamics suggested that a defendant
asserting a failing company defense could raise that contention only after the government
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tics where the government's case is predicated soley on market statistics or whether a defendant seeks to justify a merger by invoking
the failing company defense where the government's case firmly
establishes a violation of section 7, the underlying rationale is the
same. In either case, the defendant is necessarily claiming that because a company which is financially failing or technologically
weak will no longer be a factor in the market, a merger to which
that company is a party will not substantially lessen competition.
Thus, the failing company defense and the depleted resources defense allowed by the Court in General Dynamics are generally indistinguishable in their underlying antitrust premise.
The question that lower courts have had to address is whether or
not the opinion in General Dynamics has made the more stringent
requirements of the failing company defense mere "excess baggage."8 0 The Court effectively appears to have done just that.
Lower courts, depending upon outcome orientations, may view a
defendant's factual allegations within the analytical framework of
the failing company defense and its stringent two-prong test or
that of a competitive realities defense which imposes no conditions
upon merging competitors and tends to downplay the significance
of horizontal integration to the market.
The ambiguity created by General Dynamics in evaluating a
failing company defense along with alternative defense arguments
is exemplified by the decision in United States v. M.P.M., Inc..'1
The combination challenged in that case was the acquisition of
stock of Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc: and Mobile Concrete, Inc., the
third and fourth largest producers of ready-mix concrete in the
Denver metropolitan area, by a holding company, Mobile-Pre-Mix,
Inc., formed solely for the stock acquisition. The integration resulted in a company which controlled a combined market share of
31.3% .8
Conceding that statistics reflecting the share of the market controlled by the industry leaders and the parties to the merger are

had firmly established its case. Moreover, the Court refused to impose the alternative purchaser and grave probability of business failure requirements of the failing company defense
in evaluating the defendant's evidence, notwithstanding that the government's statistical
case plainly reflected the current market realities as perceived by competitors and customers. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
80. See Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 251
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Robinson].
81. 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975).
82. Id. at 91.
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the primary indicia of market power, the district court nevertheless looked beyond the statistical evidence presented by the government to other facts relevant to this particular case. The court
found that prior to the challenged acquisition Mobile was in dire
financial straits.88 Mobile was deeply in debt and could obtain
further financing through either capital or credit. The court found
that Mobile's only alternative to business failure was the combination in question.8" The court therefore upheld the merger, apparently under the failing company doctrine.
The court also considered what could be characterized as an "efficiency" defense. The court determined that substantial economies could be realized through the combination of the two entities.
The cement market allegedly required substantial capitalization.
Consequently, the advantages accruing to combining management
and office overhead and riding the credit coattails of Pre-Mix were
highly attractive to Mobile. Thus, the merger produced operational
improvements and, more importantly, allowed Mobile to take advantage of Pre-Mix's solid line of credit.""
The court also concluded that Pre-Mix and Mobile tended to
complement each other in terms of prospective customers. Pre-Mix
dealt largely with commercial and industrial builders. Mobile's
market, on the other hand, was concentrated among residential
contractors. The court found that the complementary use of such
customer lists occasioned by combining the two operations might
bring Mobile out of financial debilitation. 8
Finally, the court determined that the merger would have
procompetitive effects because the service to be offered by the Mobile-Pre-Mix combination would be superior to that offered by either of the previously indepedent companies. In considering the
motives of the defendants, the court concluded that the merger
was motivated by a desire to improve the companies' competitive
position in supplying their contractor customers, who were themselves becoming larger, in order to compete for the bigger construction jobs. 87 Consequently, the court found that the merger may

83. Id. at 98.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 101.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 102.

87.

The court stated:
Antitrust law, of course, favors internal expansion as a means of maintaining competitive position; this avenue, however, was not a feasible alternative in the present case in light of Mobile's debilitated financial condition. . . . A valid business
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have stimulated rather than depressed competition."8
The M.P.M. decision contains elements of several of the defense
theories that have surfaced in horizontal merger cases since 1974.
Although the financial weakness of a merging company apparently
was analyzed as a separate factor, the court did not precisely distinguish the failing company defense from more basic substantive
arguments. More importantly, the court apparently accepted defendant's theory that the creation of a single stronger competitor
from two smaller companies was equivalent to promoting overall
competition in the relevant market and that this promotion of
competition generally outweighed any negative impact on competition in particular areas.
The M.P.M. decision also highlights the problems which a court
must be prepared to address in evaluating the propriety of the assertion of a failing company defense in light of General Dynamics.
First, it is significant to note that evidence which satisfies the two
basic requirements of the failing compayny defense does not necessarily demonstrate that a merger involving the allegedly failing
company will not substantially lessen competition. The failing
company doctrine is premised in part on the questionable assumption that there will not be a substantial lessening of competition
where a merger involves a company which will soon leave the market because of the company's grave probability of business failure.
The mere fact that one party to a horizontal merger faces the grave
probability of business failure, however, does not preclude a finding that competition would be substantially lessened by the
merger. 89

purpose obviously cannot, without more, defeat the application of the Clayton
Act, but it is also a proper contextual element to consider.
Id. at 93.
88. Id. at 94.
89. One student commentator has stated that a merger between a dominant firm and a
failing company can produce six anti-competitive effects:
(a) It would enable a dominant firm to move quickly and cheaply into a new
market by acquisition of a failing company where, but for the doctrine, the transaction would be in violation of section 7.
(b) By increasing the acquiring firm's capacity to fill orders which it would otherwise be unable to accept, the company could strengthen its position in the market and prevent competitors from handling the overflow of business that would
otherwise result.
(c) By removing productive facilities from the market a potential entrant might
be forestalled from entry since he would face the increased cost of building new
facilities and having these new facilities swell the total productive capacity of the
market.
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Second, because a horizontal merger is often primarily motivated
by the acquiring company's desire to obtain additional customer
lists and relationships, the merger may result in a reduction in production capacity and the elimination of jobs. If a thorough analysis
reveals that a merger between a failing and a dominant company
would ultimately reduce supply and simply reallocate customers to
the acquiring company, the merger should be held plainly illegal
under section 7. The same analysis should hold true in analyzing
the validity of any competitive realities defense asserted on the authority of General Dynamics.
On the other hand, in InternationalShoe Co. v. FTC,90 the Supreme Court recognized that a merger with a failing company
could prevent "loss to its stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were operated .... " Moreover, Congress, in

the House and Senate Reports on the 1950 amendments to section
7, quoted this portion of the Supreme Court's opinion in International Shoe with approval." This underlying social policy consideration recognized by both the Supreme Court and Congress may
require courts to allow failing companies to merge even when economic policy and literal application of section 7 would bar merger.
The decision a court reaches as to whether a horizontal merger violates section 7 must reflect a proper balance between these conflicting policy commands."

(d) The acquiring firm would probably obtain less of the business of the defunct
company if the latter experienced total business collapse than if it effectively
stepped into the shoes of the failing company and appropriated the remaining
good will plus valuable customer lists, price data and other important business
information.
(e) Of increasing importance, a large enterprise could vertically integrate by
purchasing a failing company and thereby eliminate a customer of or supplier to
other competitors, depending on whether the integration was backward or forward, respectively, which might result in a substantial lessening of competition in
the relevant market.
(f) Such an acquisition might give the acquiring firm an increased percentage of
the market and increased market dominance, which has in itself been viewed as an
undesirable result.
See Updating, supra note 47, at 577-78.
90. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
91. Id. at 302.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S. REP.No.4 1775, 81st Cong.;
2d Sess. 7 (1950). See also Bok, supra note 21, at 339-40.
93. See King's Horses, supra note 47; Updating, supra note 47. Because this analysis
requires the definition and balancing of economic and social interests underlying the failing
company doctrine, it is clearly preferable to the current treatment of the defense which rests
upon the flawed premise that failing company mergers do not substantially lessen
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Finally, the "alternative purchaser" requirement of the failing
company defense more accurately reflects predictable effects of a
merger on competition than does the more subjective requirement
of "grave probability of business failure". The alternative purchaser requirement states that if another purchaser could acquire
the failing company with consequences less anticompetitive than
those from the merger that actually occurred, a court will disallow
the merger and, in effect, force the company to take the less anticompetitive route. The primary purpose of the alternative purchaser requirement then is to insure that the merged company
pursues the least anticompetitive path before the failing company
defense comes into play."
The alternative purchaser requirement often has the practical
effect of establishing whether a company is actually failing. The
existence of alternative purchasers may reflect the fact that a company is not actually facing a grave probability of business failure." 5
A court's refusal to sanction a merger because a party fails to satisfy the alternative purchaser requirement also does not threaten
injury to employees or to the community where the company is
located. 9" A court's decision to forbid the merger on this basis will
do no more than simply force the company to seek out the alternaive purchaser. The company, therefore, will remain in the
market and no injury will occur except to shareholders who presumably would receive less for their shares than they could receive
from a purchaser interested in procuring market power rather than
productive assets. Considerations of that form of shareholder injury, however, are clearly irrelevant to an analysis of a failing company defense.
Financial Weakness Defense
As an alternative to the traditional failing company defense, a
claim of "weakened financial resources" has been acceptd by some
courts as a sufficient defense to a section 7 challenge to a horizontal merger. For example, in United States v. InternationalHarvester Co., 97 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
acquisition by the defendant, International Harvester Company, a

competition.
94. See notes 48 and 50 supra and accompanying text.
95. See Bok, supra note 21, at 345.
96. Id.
97. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
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major manufacturer and seller of four-wheel drive farm tractors, of
the Steiger Company, another dominant figure in the tractor industry, did not violate section 7. The court found that evidence of
the severe financial straits of the Steiger Company negated the
government's prima facie case based on market statistics, even
though the company's financial condition was not so grave as to
warrant an application of the failing company defense.98 The court
suggested that evidence of weakened financial resources either established a "General Dynamics defense" by indicating that government statistics did not accurately reflect the state of the market
or, alternatively, constituted a significant factor under a Brown
Shoe-type analysis which would support a conclusion that a substantial lessening of competition had not occurred."
Although the reasoning of General Dynamics suggests that evidence of weakened financial resources might rebut a section 7
charge, the acceptance of such a defense often is at variance with
the very economic policies underlying section 7.100 By contending
that the weakened finances of a party to a merger should rebut the
statistical evidence introduced by the government, a defendant
necessarily relies upon the rationale that there will not be a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant business market
because, absent the merger, the company with weakened financial
resources would not be a vigorous competitor in that market. This
argument has two potential flaws which should make it subject to
close judicial scrutiny. First, the degree of financial difficulty
claimed by a company asserting the weakened finances defense is
necessarily less than that of a company which satisfies the criteria
of the failing company defense. Yet, as noted previously, a merger
between one dominant and one falling company may nonetheless
98. Id. at 774-76.
99. Id. at 773-74. See also United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108
(E.D. Pa. 1978), discussed at notes 118-121 infra and accompanying text, where the defendant asserted both a technological and financial weakness defense.
100. It can be suggested that courts which have approved of the weakened finances defense have failed to properly focus on the effects of merger on competition and rather have
accepted without proper question pro-efficiency defense arguments. In InternationalHarvester, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the merger improved the financial condition
and operating efficiencies of both parties to the merger. United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 778 (7th Cir. 1977). Yet, this emphasis ignores the basic premise
underlying § 7 of the Clayton Act that all mergers which substantially lessen competition in
any market are illegal regardless of the economies of scale the merger helps two companies
to achieve.
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substantially lessen competition.10 1 A merger with a company
which is not failing but is merely not strongly competitive then can
have a much greater anticompetitive impact.
A second reason why a court should critically scrutinize a merger
involving a company with weak finances rests in the possibility of
future recovery from the company's financial doldrums as a result
of technological innovation, improved management or non-horizon-

tal integration. Furthermore, the social policies which are to be
considered when a company faces the grave probability of business
failure are simply not present when a company is merely having
financial difficulties. Because the company is still a functioning en-

tity, employees and the broader community are not exposed to the
injury which a business failure can cause.102
Even assuming that the weakened finances defense is not inherently suspect, lower federal courts have still failed to impose barriers to the assertion of the defense which would ensure that horizontal merger was the least anticompetitive alternative available at
the time the company with weakened financial resources decided
to merge. 0 3s Arguably, the failure of the lower courts to require
that a defendant asserting a weakened finances defense prove that
alternative purchasers or alternative sources of funds were unavailable is consistent with the limited search for alternatives required
by the Supreme Court in General Dynamics."1 As courts applying

101. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
102. See Bok, supra note 21, at 341.
103. One commentator has even suggested that the Supreme Court in GeneralDynamics
did impose such a limitation on the assertion of any business justifications defenses
presented in rebuttal to a § 7 horizontal merger challenge.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the Court has opened the floodgates to the purchase of companies which are less than 100 percent healthy. In
answer to the Government's argument that despite depleted reserves the acquired
firm could have obtained new ones, the Court emphasized that no such reserves
were available and, indeed, that they had been unsuccessfully sought. This suggests that, before a presumptively illegal merger can be saved by the acquired
company's competitive shortcomings, the defendant will have to show that there
was no reasonable solution to its financial difficultues short of outright acquisition.
If, for example, an acquired company's poor prospects stemmed from inferior
management or a lackadaisical sales force, and better personnel could have been
hired, the General Dynamics Court would presumably regard this type of weakness as insufficient to rebut the presumption of illegality. A closer question is how
the Court would react to the horizontal acquisition of a company whose market
share, though still substantial, had been steadily declining for a number of years
prior to the merger despite valiant efforts by its management to arrest the trend.
Robinson, supra note 80, at 251-52.
104. The Court in General Dynamics refused to speculate whether United Electric could
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the failing company doctrine have recognized, however, the requirement that the defendant show that alternatives to horizontal
merger are unavailable assures the court that
merger is the least
10 5
anticompetitive route a company could take.
Technological Weakness Defense
The rationale which underlies the weakened finances defense
also is the basis for the technological weakness defense. A technologically weak company is not a singificant competitor in the market, it is argued, and therefore a merger involving that company
will not substantially lessen competition. Defendants raising this
defense commonly present evidence that the produce which the acquired company manufactured was technologically obsolescent,0 6
or that materials necessary to production were depleted.'07 Some
defendants also have claimed that their company lacked the technical expertise necessary to run the company efficiently and
profitably.1 0 8
Lower courts have differed in their treatment of a technological
weakness defense. Some courts have accepted the defense as
presented as a justification for merger. 10 9 Other courts have gone
quite far in speculating whether there are alternatives to merger to
resolve the problem of technological weakness or failure. 10 Where
it is possible for the company to overcome the failure or weakness,
those courts have concluded that the company can remain an independent force in the market and should not be allowed to become
a partner to a merger.

develop the expertise to mine deep reserves. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, argued that very little speculation on the part of the Court
was actually required because United Electric already possessed deep reserves and, at one
point in its history, had actually mined them. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486, 524-25 (1974). Thus, any inquiry as to the existence of anticompetitive alternatives
which might be required by the Court under GeneralDynamics would appear to be of very
limited scope. But cf. Robinson, supra note 80, at 251.
105. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
106. See In re RSR Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800 (1976), discussed at notes 115-117 infra and
accompanying text; In re Litton Indus. Inc., 85 F.T.C. 333 (1975).
107. See United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975), discussed at
notes 111-114 infra and accompanying text.
108. See United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
discussed at notes 118-121 infra and accompanying text. See also In re American Gen. Ins.
Co., 89 F.T.C. 557 (1977).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956 (D.Conn. 1975).
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An example of this latter approach is found in United States v.
Amax, Inc."' Two producers of refined copper merged to create a
company which ranked fourth in the refined copper industry. The
government established a prima facie case by showing that, after
the merger, the top four firms in the industry controlled 71.5% to
73.4% of the relevant market..' The defendant asserted that the
acquired company had experienced technological difficulties which
make the operation of that company's mine costly and, absent
merger, would force the company to leave the market in the near
future. In response to this defense, the court held that the acquired company could either obtain adequate financial aid to overcome the technological difficulties or could go out of business, thus
permitting a more profitable corporation to take over the operation
of the mine.113 The court then concluded that the merger was a
114
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The Federal Trade Commission has adopted a similar position
with respect to the technological weakness defense. In In re RSR
Corp.,11 5 a secondary lead producer claimed that the secondary
lead industry was threatened with decline because of the development of the maintenance-free battery which requires a different
type of lead. The Commission held that, because the future of the
maintenance-free battery was uncertain, the defendant failed to establish that secondary lead was obsolescent."1 Further, even if the
maintenance-free battery were to become widely produced, the
Commission nonetheless felt that the secondary lead industry
could begin to produce the type of lead necessary for the manufac11 7
ture of the maintenance-free battery.
A far less rigorous application of the technological weakness defense is represented by the opinion of the district court in United

.111. 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975).
112. Id. at 964-67.
113. Id. at 970-71.
114. The defendant also raised a depleted resources defense similar to that asserted by
the defendant in General Dynamics. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. The defendant argued that the high grade copper blister it had refined in the past was no longer
available. Although the court found this "a more serious contention" than the technological
weaknesses of the acquired company, 402 F. Supp. at 971, it nonetheless concluded that the
arguments were not meritorious in that the blister actually was available and, even if it had
not been, the defendant could have refined copper scrap. Id. at 971-72.
115. 88 F.T.C. 800 (1976).
116. Id. at 891-92.

117. Id.
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States v. Consolidated Foods Corp.118 The court held that a
merger between two producers of retail frozen dessert pies did not
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act where one of the parties to the
merger, Sara Lee, was experiencing a financial decline and technological difficulties.11 9 Significantly, the court did not consider
whether Consolidated Food Corporations, Sara Lee's successful
parent, 20 could have provided financial resources to Sara Lee
which might have helped to fund the acquisition of expertise in the
retail pie market. Moreover, the court failed to examine whether
alternative possibilities, other than merger, were open to Sara Lee
at a minimum,
to solve its financial and technological problems or,
2
whether an alternative purchaser was available.'

1

Again, as is the case with a weakened financial resources defense,
a weakened technological resources defense engenders two inherent
problems which put the defense at variance with the economic policies underlying section 7 of the Clayton Act. First, a merger with a
company which is merely experiencing technological difficulties
does not necessarily preclude the merger from being one which
might substantially lessen competition.12 Second, the technologically weak company may, at some time in the future, recover from
improved manageits business inadequacies through innovation,
23
ment or non-horizontal integration.

A strict approach to the defense at the least will ensure that a
merger is the least anticompetitive route a company could take to
solve the problems arising from technological difficulties. On the
other hand, a liberal application of the defense offers no such assurance. Indeed, such an approach clearly undercuts the congressional policy underlying section 7 of the Clayton Act in that efficiency is sought to be promoted at the expense of a substantial
118. 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
119. Id. at 136.
120. Consolidated Foods Corporation ranked 78th in Fortune's 1977 Directory of the
Five Hundred Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations. Id. at 123.

121.

The court found persuasive the defendant's evidence that-

[the] company's lack of success in the retail pie market [was attributable] to its
inability to match other manufacturers in either quality or price. Sara Lee has had
to sell its pies for 50 to 60 cents more than, for example, Mrs. Smith's, without
being able to offer the consumer a corresponding quality advantage. Sara Lee's
lack of success in the retail business, and the company's persistent inability to
solve the problem, has caused it to refrain from entering the institutional pie
trade.
Id. at 136.
122. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
123. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
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lessening of competititon.
The "Procompetitive" Promotion of Efficiency Defense
Consideration of a procompetitive "efficiency" argument is best
represented by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in
United States v. InternationalHarvester Co."2 4 In that case, the
target firm of the merger, Steiger Company, was in urgent need of
added financing and improved facilities in order to take advantage
of the growing four-wheel drive tractor market. The acquiring firm,
International Harvester, was interested in procuring more fourwheel drive tractors produced by Steiger. International Harvester
also was motivated by the desire to avoid a "several-year hiatus"
while developing its own manufacturing facilities. 2 8 The defense
evidence suggested that Steiger could not easily obtain additional
financing through any means other than the acquisition in question."'6 Moreover, Steiger could not supply International Harvester's demand for tractors unless it secured added capital and
12 7
increased its production facilities.
The challenged acquisition allowed Steiger to obtain needed
financing while still maintaining the status of an independent business entity because the agreement provided that Steiger could
enter into business ventures free from International Harvester's
consent or control. Further, the infusion of capital strengthened
Steiger as an aggressive independent company within the fourwheel drive tractor industry and prevented other larger manufacturers from increasing their market share at the expense of Steiger.12 s As Steiger became able to increase both its production and
market share, International Harvester and other companies were
assured of an increased supply of four-wheel drive tractors. 2" Because both Steiger and International Harvester would be better
able to compete efficiently as a result of the merger, the court concluded that the acquisition would promote rather than hamper
competition and, consequently, the merger was not a violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act.13 0
Relying on a similar rationale in dismissing the complaint in In
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977), discussed in notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text.
564 F.2d at 778.
Id. at 775-76.
Id. at 776-77.
Id. at 778.

129. Id.
130.

Id. at 780.
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re The Pillsbury Company,3 1 the Federal Trade Commission determined that the challenged acquisition of Fox Deluxe Foods, Inc.
by The Pillsbury Company did not violate section 5 of the Federal
Trade Act or section 7 of the Clayton Act. The complaint alleged
that the acquisition of Fox by Pillsbury, where those companies
respectively had 2.4% and 13.7% of the market, would substantially lessen competition, increase concentration, and encourage
further acquisition by other leading firms in the frozen pizza industry in the United States. The Commission found, however, that
although the acquisition would eliminate a competitor and increase
concentration in the frozen pizza industry, enhancement of Pillsbury's competitive strength probably would result in a substantial
increase in competition in areas where Pillsbury had not previously
competed. 18 '
Although statistics established a prima facie violation of section
7, the Commission concluded that it should look beyond statistics
to facts relevant to the particular industry and parties. The Commission believed that the frozen pizza industry was already competitive with relatively low entry barriers.13 3 Fox was a weak competitor because it was suffering from acute financial problems and
poor management. Although Fox was not a "failing company"
within the meaning of the failing company doctrine, the Commission did take the company's weakness into consideration in reaching its determination.'" Because Fox did not have sufficient resources to compete effectively, the Commission ruled that the
acquisition would not substantially lessen competition. 83
In so assessing the competitive effects of the merger, the Commission effectively accepted what can be characterized as a procompetitive "efficiency" argument. The Commission found that
the acquisition created more jobs in the Fox production plant, upgraded the physical condition of those facilities through a substantial investment of capital, and resulted in more viable competition
in the frozen pizza industry than would have been the case if Fox
had continued as a separate entity. Clearly the Commission
thought that the combination of Fox and Pillsbury could better
utilize management skills and resources than either entity could do

131.
132.
133.

93 F.T.C. 966 (1979).
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1040.

134. Id. at 1015.
135.

Id. at 1011.
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separately. 1 6
The "efficiency" principle was also raised in RSR Corp. v.
FTC.,1 7 but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defense as contrary to Clayton Act policy. In that case, RSR owned
two lead smelting plants which produced 12.16% of all the secondary lead in the United States. RSR merged with Quemetco, Inc.,
which owned 7.02% of the market, and by late- 1972, RSR controlled 19.18% of the highly concentrated secondary lead market. " ' RSR argued that PhiladelphiaNationalBank impliedly approved mergers of small entities to facilitiate competition with
larger companies. The court, however, rejected this argument. " '
Further, the court rejected RSR's argument that the merger pro14 0
vided "greater efficiency of operation."
Substantial questions may be raised as to whether the defense of
efficiency is an appropriate factor to be considered under the General Dynamics rationale, particularly where the defense is asserted
by a larger member of an industry or where the market is not already concentrated.14 1 Indeed, the Supreme court itself has several
times rejected an "efficiency" or "economies of scale" defense in
merger cases. " 2 Significantly, although a General Dynamics defense is designed to rebut the government's prima facie case by
attacking the accuracy of its statistics and thus the anticompetitive
impact of the merger, the efficiency argument admits the reliability
of the government's figures but maintains that the lessening of
competition in some products or with respect to some customers is
eventually outweighed by the benefits of greater "competition"
136. The Commission stated:
The merger of Pillsbury and Fox was decided upon to solve the pressing production problem which Pillsbury had and enable Pillsbury to more nearly meet its
production needs and most important from the standpoint of Section 7 to enter
into competition in an already concentrated industry in new geographic areas
which Fox had been unable to enter.

Id.
137. 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979).
138. Id. at 1324.
139. The court stated that "anticompetitive effects in one market cannot be offset by
procompetitive effects in another market." Id. at 1325.
140. Id.
141. One writer has labeled the efficiency defense "inconsistent not only with the thrust
of General Dynamics, but also with antitrust policy in general, which prefers internal
growth to growth by merger." See Horizontal Mergers, supra note 9 at 508. But see Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977).
142. See FTC v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
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gained by means of increased efficiency. Simply stated, the efficiency argument equates an integrated, strengthened competitor
with strengthened competition, suggesting generally that it is more
procompetitive to have one dominant competitor than two less
dominant entities: what is good for the businessman-defendant is
good for the economy. Because arguments predicated on principles
of efficiency are thus so analytically distinct from other competitive realities defenses promoted under General Dynamics, it is not
yet clear to what extent efficiency defenses can or should be allowed to rebut a merger challenge under section 7 of the Clayton
4
Act.1 3
THE IMPACT OF SHERMAN ACT STANDARDS UPON HORIZONTAL
MERGER ANALYSIS

In addition to recognizing new defenses, courts in horizontal
merger cases have increasingly been influenced by Sherman Act
rule of reason criteria. Although it is true that one "cannot ignore
the additional analysis made necessary in a Clayton Act suit by the
decision in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 1 4 the
courts seem to have come full circle with the development of the
post-General Dynamics defenses, from the virtual per se standards
of illegality initially imposed under section 7 of the Clayton Act"1"
to a competitive reasonableness approach more appropriate in a
Sherman Act case. This development is particularly troublesome
given that Congress specifically enacted the Celler-Kefauver Act to
remedy the perceived shortcomings of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.146
The Development of the Hybrid Per Se Rule in Sherman Act
Merger Cases
Although a de facto per se rule was applied in some early rail-

143. It would appear that arguments made by commentators as to the merits of an efficiency defense have had some impact on Congress. In a recently proposed bill, to bar conglomerate mergers of major corporations, language was inserted which specifically acknowledged the promotion of efficiency as a valid defense to an antimerger challenge. Small and
Independent Business Protection Act of 1979, Section 3(a), S.600, 96th Cong. (1979). For a
more recent consideration of this issue, however, see Rzporr OF THE CoMmrrrEE ON SMALL

BusINEss, Housz

OF REPRSErNTATiES, CoNGLOMERATE MERGERS-THEIR EFFECTS ON SMALL

BusiNEss AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (October 2, 1980).
144. United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956, 970 (D. Conn. 1975).
145. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
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road merger cases brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act,""
the Supreme Court soon established a balancing test to determine
whether a merger resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade. In
United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,"48 the Court spelled out some
of the relevant factors:
In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we do not
think the dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we
look rather to the percentage of business controlled, the strength
of the remaining competition, whether the action springs from
business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable development of the industry, consumer demands, and other characteristics of the market. We do not undertake to prescribe any set
of percentage figures by which to measure the reasonableness of a
corporation's enlargement of its activities by the purchase of the
assets of a competitor. The relative effect of percentage command
of a market
varies with the setting in which that factor is
14
placed.

Several problems are inherent in the Court's standard, however,
both in terms of substance and procedure. First, as observed by
Justice Douglas in his dissent in Columbia Steel,1 50 this Sherman
Act analysis cannot be reconciled with the Court's contemporaneous decision in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc..16 1
There the Court, in invalidating a proposed merger challenged
under the Sherman Act, had come very close to invoking a hybrid
per se rule similar to that which the Court had applied in tying
arrangement cases and in early merger cases.15 2 Second, the discussion in Columbia Steel of the horizontal aspects of the merger was
badly lacking in analysis and failed to indicate any reasoned rejection of the per se rule. For these reasons, some commentators have
suggested that the decision has little precedential value.1 88
This conclusion finds support in a recent case where the Supreme Court again was presented with the opportunity to apply
section 1 of the Sherman Act to a horizontal merger and did so in a
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
size is
abuse.
153.

See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
334 U.S. 495 (1948).
Id. at 527-28.
Id. at 534-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
334 U.S. 131 (1948).
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated: "In the opinion of the majority...
itself an earmark of monopoly power. For size carries with it an opportunity for
. . ." Id. at 174.
See, ARmgA, ANTrritusr ANALYss, 696 (1967).
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manner consistent with Paramount Pictures. In United States v.
First National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington,'" the section 1
analysis applied to a horizontal merger appeared to be predicated
on a per se rule where a finding of illegality in a banking context
was upheld based solely upon market share statistics. 65 Furthermore, as recently as 1975, in United States v. Blue Bell," 6 Lexington Bank was cited for the proposition that it is unnecessary for a
court to conduct an in-depth inquiry into numerical market share
157
data in a section 1 merger case.

The Emergence of a Rule of Reason Analysis in Clayton Act
Cases
Even in light of this recent precedent supporting a per se rule,
the Burger Court applied a Columbia Steel rule of reason analysis
to its most recent consideration of a bank merger challenged in
part under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In United States v. Citizens and Southern National Bank,158 Citizens and Southern National Bank (C&S) sought to acquire its "five percent de facto
branches" as true branches when Georgia law changed in 1970 to
permit "de jure" branch banking countywide. 5 9 The government
contended that this acquisition would violate both section seven of
the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court found that even though the merging banks were legally distinct corporate entities, the two had previously been associated in such a close relationship that in reality no competition
existed between them. 60 Moreover, in recognizing that the "de
facto" branches were a direct response to Georgia's historic restrictions on "de jure" branching,'' 6 the Court implied that the C&S
154.
155.

376 U.S. 665 (1964).
The Court stated: "Where, as here, the merging companies are major competitive

factors in a relevant market, the elimination of significant competition between them constitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 672-73. Significantly, one year later, in
United States v. Manufacturer Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the
Southern District of New York concluded: "[tihere is neither need, nor purpose ... to consider or determine whether the [reasonableness] factors .. .offset the anticompetitive effect." Id. at 955.
156. 395 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
157. Id. at 548. The court stated that an "acquisition that constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade under.

stantial
158.
159.
160.
161.

.

.Section 1 . . .gives rise to a reasonable probability of a sub-

lessening of competition." Id.
422 U.S. 86 (1975).
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 116.
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"de facto" branching program was, on balance, procompetitive in
that it enhanced C&S as a competitive entity and provided strong
competition for the other suburban banks.
Based upon such findings, the Court held the C&S program of
founding new "de facto" branches did not infringe section 1 of the
Sherman Act."" Having found no violation of that section, the
Court further concluded that there was no violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, stating that there could be no actual proof of any
lessening of competition where, as a practical matter, there had
been insignificant competitive conduct. 1 3 The Court did not, however, consider in detail the procompetitive alternative eliminated
by allowing the merger, i.e. requiring the defendant to divest itself
of its suburban banks and, thus, create new competition.
The Court's decision thus reaffirmed the interpretation of the
Clayton Act introduced in General Dynamics and strongly suggested that similar considerations should govern an evaluation of
the legality of a horizontal merger challenged under the Sherman
Act. It is arguable that the Burger Court, in so far intertwining
Sherman Act and Clayton Act standards,'" has at this point rejected the government's use of statistics and market shares to
demonstrate an "incipient" or potential anticompetitive effect.
Rather, the Court may instead be requiring proof of a demonstrable anticompetitive impact or actual restraint of trade, the standard imposed under section 1 of the Sherman Act, even in cases
brought solely under section 7 of the Clayton Act.16 The broadened factual inquiries undertaken by lower courts in cases decided
since General Dynamics and the acceptance of some versions of an
"efficiency" defense, under which the creation of a stronger competitor is equated with the promotion of competition, underscore
the resurgence of a "presumptive validity" rule of reason approach
even in cases challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act. At the
least, such an approach clearly renders it more difficult to establish
an antitrust violation in a horizontal merger case than does a distinct section 7 standard of per se illegality or a standard based on
the hybrid Sherman Act per se rule designed to prevent concentration in its incipiency.s
162.
163.
164.
165.
note 67
166.

Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 120-22.
See SULLIVAN, supra note 18 § 200.
See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974), discussed in
supra..
See generally F & M Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814 (2d
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A SUGGESTED CLAYTON ACT ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS

Although the factual situations underlying the post-General Dynamics defenses differ, the defenses all rest upon the same underlying premise: a merger with a failing or weak company will not
substantially lessen competition because the merging company was
not or would not in the future be a competitive factor in the market. Each of these defenses raises similar questions regarding the
economic and social policies of antitrust merger law. Substantive
consistency thus requires that courts should adopt a uniform analytical framework for all non-market share defenses.
The Threshold Inquiry: A Search for a Less Anticompetitive
Alternative
Some boundaries would be helpful to enable lower courts to consistently respond to the as yet unlimited technological weakness
and weakened finances defenses. A threshold determination should
be whether a company has any feasible alternatives to merger
whereby the company might resolve its problems and yet remain
an independent factor, however small, in the market. For example,
a merging company contending that it is weak because it presently
lacks the capital or expertise necessary to expand or produce a
technologically competitive product should be required to demonstrate that it is unlikely it will be able to obtain from another
source either the funding necessary for technological development
or the personnel with the necessary expertise. If a company does
have a reasonable alternative available which would enable it to
remain an independent force in the market, the defense should fail
and the merger should be denied.
The requirement that merger be the least anticompetitive alternative, or that horizontal mergers are presumptively illegal, would
provide a valuable restraint against an overly broad application of
the post-General Dynamics defense theories. Specifically, a defendant asserting technological weakness due to lack of expertise
would have difficulty justifying merger as the least anticompetitive
alternative because the range of alternatives available is likely to
be extensive. 167 A defendant, in a capital-intensive market, claimCir. 1979); Purex Corp. v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 419 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See
also Lurie, supra note 46.
167. For example, in United States v. Consolidated Foods, 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa.
1978), the merging company might have sought funds from the parent company or from its
lenders to finance the development and/or attraction of expertise. See note 120 supra and
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ing technological obsolescence or depleted resources, on the other
hand, may be more likely to meet with success in justifying merger.
A company truly might find it impossible to locate new raw material or to develop the expertise to mine a different ore, for example,
and its alternative merger partners might truly be limited to those
already in the market or larger conglomerates.
The Supreme Court in General Dynamics did appear to require
that a defendant make a search, albeit a limited one, for alternatives other than merger to remedy its supply problems. 168 Some
courts 169 and the Federal Trade Commission,1 70 however, have

gone further placing a heavier burden of persuasion on the defendant to show that a company might have avoided technological
failure by, for example, changing the type of material it refined or
the product it produced. On the other hand, other courts,1 71 as well

as the Commission at times,17 2 have been reluctant to make any
inquiry at ll into the defendant's alternatives to merger, deferring
to post hoc business justifications for that course of action.
Neither the limited approach originally suggested by the Supreme Court in General Dynamics nor the inconsistent positions
taken by the lower courts and the Federal Trade Commission adequately reflect the economic and social policies underlying section
7 of the Clayton Act as originally developed. By imposing a requirement that merging companies attempt all feasible alternatives
to merger before a General Dynamics defense is accepted, a court
certainly would not force companies to take futile steps to avoid
technological weakness or failure. Using this approach, the competitive realities defenses thus would more appropriately be directed
toward the remedy stage of the litigation where, in proper cases,
the court might impose equitable requirements upon the defenaccompanying text.
168. The Court in GeneralDynamics emphasized that United Electric could not obtain
other strip mine reserves but refused to speculate whether the company could develop the
expertise to mine the deep reserves it possessed. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
Thus the Court appeared to place the burden of persuasion on the government to demonstrate the existence of alternatives to merger notwithstanding its presentation of a prima
facie statistical case.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F.Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975), discussed at
notes 111-114 supra and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., In re RSR Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800 (1976), discussed at notes 115-117 supra
and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa.

1978), discussed at notes 119-121 supra and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., In re The Pillsbury Company, 93 F.T.C. 966 (1979), discussed at notes
131-136 supra and accompanying text.
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dant while not absolutely forbidding limited horizontal integration.
No Alternative to Merger: The "Failing"or Merely "Weak"
Company
If a court concludes that no feasible alternative to merger is
available to a technologically or financially weak company, the
court should then determine whether the company is "failing" or
merely "weak." The "grave probability of business failure" standard of the traditional failing company doctrine could serve as a
dividing line between "failure" and "weakness." This is not facile
categorization, but rather is a necessary determination affecting
whether merger should be permitted despite demonstrated anticompetitive effects. First, a weak company usually is not one
which will soon leave the market and, therefore, the concerns for
employees and for the community where the business is located are
not pressing. Indeed, there is always a substantial possibility that
the weak company at some future point in time may become a
stronger competitor. A court should, therefore, rarely find that evidence of a company's weakness negates a prima facie Clayton Act
case established by market share evidence introduced by the government. Further, where market statistics indicate significant market concentration, a merger to which even a weak company is a
party is very likely to substantially lessen competition and, therefore, merger should be denied.
Second, courts have long upheld "failing company" mergers on
the theory that a merger to which a failing company is a party will
not substantially lessen competition. This proposition is economically unsound, however, in that some failing company mergers may
indeed substantially lessen competition.M Because courts have relied heavily on this premise, they have failed to consider adequately the social policies underlying the failing company doctrine.
Courts should, rather, focus upon whether the company may inevitably drop from the market if the challenged merger is not permitted. Of course, courts will then have to engage in a more complex
analysis to determine whether the merger, despite its anticompetitive effects, is the best solution. This requires specific, particular
evidence of alleged economic effects to insure that the courts can
more competently weigh economic effects against countervailing
social concerns. Only where the social injury consequent to denying
173.

See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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merger outweighs the dangers to competition should the merger arguably be permitted.
A Section Seven Anamoly: The "Efficiency" Defense
The "increased efficiency" argument, whether interwoven with
other defenses or presented as a separate defense, simply should be
considered as a factor of minimal significance in section 7 analysis.
The "efficiency" argument is premised on the market logic that the
combination of two competing, weaker firms may yield a single
competitor better able to compete with other firms in the market.
Such a defense, predicated upon a public utility approach to the
economic system, necessarily operates contrary to obvious congressional intent underlying the amending of the Clayton Act to eliminate concentration and avoid even "efficient" oligopolies. 17" The
basic policy of the Act remains that all mergers which substantially
lessen competition in any market are illegal regardless of economies of scale which might otherwise result. Consequently, courts
should treat efficiency defenses as having only marginal relevance
to Clayton Act policy.
CONCLUSION

A merger between two direct competitors always has the immediate effect of diminishing competition by eliminating the target
firm and enhancing the market power of the survivor. Such a
merger can be challenged under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
or both statutes. The legislative history surrounding the original
enactment of the Clayton Act and the 1950 amendment to section
7 of the Act makes it clear, however, that Congress intended a distinctly different evaluation of mergers under the Clayton Act than
had previously occurred under the Sherman Act and further intended that mergers be prohibited which courts had been upholding under a Sherman Act rule of reason analysis.
When a court applies section 7 of the Clayton Act to a horizontal
merger, it cannot legitimately purport to downplay the obvious anticompetitive effects of the diminishment of real or perceived direct competition and consequent concentration of the market occasioned by the merger. If courts continue to equate the
strengthening of a particular competitor through short-term in174. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); International T.&T.
Corp. v. General T.&E. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 936 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Muria, The
Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CAsE W. L. Rgv. 381 (1980).
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creases in efficiency or capital availability with an increase in competition, Congress' obvious political and long-term economic concerns with trends toward oligopolies clearly will be ignored. Yet, in
light of the 1974 Supreme Court decision in General Dynamics,
the range of defense theories available in horizontal merger cases
seems limited only by the imagination of market economists and
the willingness of courts to undertake more complex analyses of
speculative future events and, thus, disavow the obvious benefit of
a hybrid per se rule.
The legislative policy concerns underlying the history of the
Clayton Act also should be recongized in the context of Sherman
Act challenges to horizontal integration. The recent apparent use
of the rule of reason approach by the Burger Court, where the
Court relied upon the defendant's allegedly benign motives and
balanced the alleged procompetitive impact of the merger against
its anticompetitive aspects, flies in the face of the congressional
intent embodied in the amendment of section 7. Certainly, in light
of inconsistent precedent, the Court eventually must confront the
questions of whether a Sherman Act challenge to a horizontal
merger requires application of a variant of the per se rule and
whether horizontal integration should be treated in the same manner as horizontal price-fixing, boycotts, or market allocation regardless of the market power of the defendants. The Court may
well conclude, as it has in tying cases, that a hybrid per se rule
should apply whenever the integrated firm resulting from a horizontal merger enjoys a dominant position in the market. As such,
the analytical focus will then properly return to the desirability of
the conduct in question as measured by the legislative intent underlying the amended Clayton Act. In other words, the process
adopted by some courts after General Dynamics, utilizing Sherman Act rule of reason theory to amend strict Clayton Act standards, must be reversed. Sherman Act merger analysis logically
should not be inconsistent with the more specific and recent congressional intent evident in the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the
Clayton Act.

